

BBC REITH LECTURES 2011: SECURING FREEDOM BARONESS ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER LECTURE ONE: TERROR

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SUE LAWLEY: Hello and welcome to the Radio Theatre in Broadcasting House, London, to the second 1. of this year's Reith Lectures. They're called *Securing Freedom*. In the first part, broadcast in June, we 2. from Aung San Suu Kyi, the Burmese opposition leader, about her 3..... to see democracy created in her 4. homeland.

Today, in the 5. that sees the tenth anniversary of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, we're on 6.....more worryingly familiar to 7.of us. The world has changed a lot 8.the World Trade Centre in New York collapsed in the face of their suicidal 9. 10. in Iraq and Afghanistan and the killing of Osama Bin Laden seem to 11.that we are locked in a never ending 12.between freedom and terror. The West may enjoy democratic 13.that the people of Burma can only envy, but how does it protect them from those who would do 14.to destroy them?

How do we balance our 15.in human freedom with the need to defend 16.against those who believe the use of terror can be17.?

To try to 18.these questions and describe how countries such as Britain 19.to secure *their* freedom, we're going to 20.three lectures from a former Director General of the British security service, MI5.

In her first lecture she will take us 21. to that terrible day in September 2001, explore its 22. and assess its lasting 23. Ladies and Gentlemen, please welcome Eliza Manningham-Buller.

(audience applause)

Eliza, just a 24.....personal questions before we begin. Just tell me 25. the rest of our generation were plotting to 26. a trainee manager with Marks and Spencer or get into publishing, were you plotting to get into spying generally?

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: Not at all. I was plotting to find a job, and I was fortunate 27. to meet somebody, I'm ashamed to 28.at a drinks party, 29.suggested that I go to the Ministry of Defence for an interview. And it went on from there.

SUE LAWLEY: But you knew what he 30.in that moment? It was the tap on...

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: *(over)* No, I didn't at all.

SUE LAWLEY: Didn't you?

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: No. I was curious to find out what it was, but I 31.,.....didn't know that it was a security intelligence organisation.

SUE LAWLEY: But what 32.would they have spotted in you that made them think she'll do for us, and 33.she may go right to the top?

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: I'm sure they didn't think that. In those days if you joined as a woman - which of course I did *(laughter)* - you had a very clear 34.path. There were a 35.....lot of things you were not 36.suitable to do.

I didn't 37.this to begin with, and when I did, I and a lot of other women officers were 38.cross about it and fought to be 39.....to do all the jobs 40..... But I can't really 41.your question, Sue, because I think they were looking for docile people at that 42.....who did sensible work in backrooms. They certainly wouldn't have dreamed of having a woman 43. of service at that stage.

SUE LAWLEY: But, as I understand it, you were 44.*not* to be docile. You were known to be formidable, not to suffer fools gladly.

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: That's what the media say. You'd have to ask my 45.....what I was like.

SUE LAWLEY: I think your school report told me you 'enjoy telling people what to do', it said.

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: To be fair, Sue, that was a report when I was five *(laughter)* 46.my mother, as parents do, 47.and gave me, and it 48.said: 'Elizabeth' - which is what my parents called me - 'is trying hard' - so give me some credit - 'not to tell everybody what to do all of the time.' *(laughter)*

SUE LAWLEY: How very subtle.

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: So I was trying to be tactful.

SUE LAWLEY: Well you're going to tell us a lot 49.what to do and what not to do, I suspect, this evening. I'm sure we're going to 50. a lot more about how MI5 works from you. Let me invite you to take to the podium and present your first lecture, which is called Terror. Ladies and Gentlemen, Eliza Manningham-Buller. (*audience applause*)

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: On the day of the 9/11 51.on New York and Washington, I was working in my office as usual. I was deputy head of the British Security Service, 52.for its intelligence operations. I came out of the room and my staff were standing, watching the television in 53..... It was difficult quite to 54.in what we were seeing. But we quickly 55.that this was terrorism and came to the 56.conclusion that Al Qaida was responsible. I don't think we stopped to eat but we 57.spent the rest of the day 58.past intelligence, directing the collection of 59.intelligence and preparing briefings and papers for 60.

The next day, I 61.to Washington to talk to our American 62.about what had happened and to offer 63. With me were the head of the Secret Intelligence Service, more usually 64.as MI6, and the head of GCHQ, our signals intelligence 65..... American airspace was closed and the officer in 66.of the RAF station at Brize Norton was 67.to let us take off, but the Prime Minister had 68.with the President that we 69.go. We landed at Andrews Air Force base and drove in 70.....to CIA headquarters.

We 71. our American friends from the CIA, the FBI and NSA, the American 72.intelligence agency, angry, shocked and 73.but also 74.and determined. They had had no sleep. Casualty numbers were, as yet,75.: there were 76.....of an even 77. death toll than was, in fact, the case. We were all haunted by 78....., the attack planes full of passengers, the slashes in the 79.of the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, collapsing floors, the raging fires, people jumping to their 80.....to escape them, pedestrians shrouded in dust, and emerging tales of 81.....and also of heroism.

In our sobering talks with the Americans we 82.on al-Qaeda, having no doubt of its 83.for the atrocities. Bin Laden had made it 84.that he wished to kill Americans and their 85., and before 9/11 substantial intelligence effort was directed a 86. him and his group. 87.the actual attacks were a shock, we had been 88.all summer by intelligence of 89.al-Qaeda plans. And the attacks 90. characteristics which were familiar to us, coordinated suicide attacks 91. to cause maximum casualties, carefully planned and executed without 92. We discussed how intelligence could be 93. to provide more extensive insights to al-Qaeda to try to prevent further attacks.

94.the United States has many more intelligence 95.than the UK, but they welcomed our offer of support. And, of course, after 30 years of conflict in Northern Ireland, we had 96. experience of terrorism on our 97.soil.

After the talks, we went back to the British Embassy. We were all in a reflective 98.and talked late into the night in the garden about what had 99. and what the next steps 100. be. We discussed 101.the United States 102.....take direct military action in Afghanistan where al-Qaeda was based. What were the 103.implications for our own citizens? And we mulled on the 104.options open to the US Government and, more 105., to other Western governments. I recall that one of those present 106.that the peace process 107.....Israel and the Palestinians needed to be revived, an explicit 108. that the West needed to re-address the open sore in the Middle East that could well have 109.to these events. Those present 110. It was important, even at this 111.stage, following a monstrous crime, to consider all possible ways of reducing the 112..... of further attacks.

113.talk of military action, there was one thing we all agreed on: terrorism is resolved 114.politics and economics not through arms and intelligence, however important a role 115.play.

And I call it a crime, not an act of war. Terrorism is a violent tool used for political 116.to bring pressure on governments by creating fear in the117..... . In the same way, I have never thought it helpful to refer to a "war" on terror, any more 118.to a war on drugs. For one thing that 119.the terrorists as warriors; for another thing terrorism is a 120....., not a state. 121....., terrorism will continue in some form 122.the outcome, if there is one, of such a "war". For me what happened was a crime and needs to be 123.of as such. What made it different from 124.attacks was its 125.and audacity, not its nature.

I understand that the United States, with its long 126.of offering sanctuary to the "huddled masses" under the towering 127.of the Statue of Liberty and its128., sometimes surprising to a European, of its land 129.a safe refuge, saw 9/11 as a declaration of war, on its own soil, to which a military response was 130.and appropriate.

But 131.....9/11 was the next episode in al-Qaeda's targeting of the United States and her 132....., explicitly stated by Bin Laden as his intention, and already demonstrated, for 133., in the attacks on the US Embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 134. and on the USS Cole in the Yemen in 135.

My colleagues and I, and our friends 136. the world, had often 137.to second 138.what terrorist groups might do next. Sometimes we were steered by intelligence, and were able to take precautions. But we also tried to think 139.about what we, if

motivated by the 140.of a terrorist, might do to inflict major 141.on a nation and to 142. fear among its citizens. Terrorist groups 143. and change.

The Provisional IRA had 144. from killing and maiming drinkers in 145. Birmingham pubs to its more sophisticated attacks on the City of London, designed to drive away 146.investment and 147.the UK economically. I think what shocked us all on 9/11 was the realisation that these events changed the world. That, if terrorists could 148. mount such attacks within the United States, 149.was possible Bin Laden must have expected that these murderous attacks would 150.a reaction that would make it 151.....for him to 152.others of his argument that Islam was under attack from the West. It suited his agenda for Muslims to be 153.with suspicion. In addition to mass casualties, Bin Laden 154.....an economic impact 155.driving up security costs and disrupting normal life.

Our imaginations, spurred by these 156.....and by intelligence, took rein on what else al-Qaeda 157.....do. The prospect of chemical, bacteriological or radiological terrorism looked more 158..... Bin Laden had said in 1998 that 159.....chemical or nuclear 160.....to defend Muslims was a “religious duty” and that was a very real 161.....in the years 162..... . We knew, and know now, 163.....fragile our security can be. The extreme stories of fiction and film no 164.seemed so fantastic 165.....much of what we 166.....and worried about has not happened, not 167.....because of the efforts internationally of security and intelligence agencies and the police.

Was it an attack on freedom 168.as some have asserted? I think the answer is complex. Aung San Suu Kyi talked of the right to live "free from fear". She was speaking in the context of living under a 169.....and capricious military junta, and we all hope that her patient opposition to it will 170..... But there are also 171.....to our freedoms in the 172.of the West. We expect to live 173.....free from fear, at least the fear of being blown to bits when going about our 174.lives. So there was an attack on that freedom. We were all 175.

I remember, for example how, for months, I looked up 176.I heard a plane overhead and wondered if it was on course and being 177.....by bona fide pilots. There are a few Muslims who argue that democracy, the right to elect a secular 178.does not accord with Islamic principles. A bit of history here. Sayyid Qutb, a 179. member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, was disgusted by what he thought was the 180.....and materialism of the United States when he lived there as a student 181.....after the Second World War. That view influenced his 182....., Swahili, now the leader of al-Qaeda. Both could be said to have 183.the freedom of American citizens to live as they wish 184.the law.

It is perhaps worth 185.that the modern Muslim Brotherhood does not 186.....to those non-democratic views and 187.condemned 9/11.

But I still find it difficult to accept that the terror attacks were on "freedom" or democracy as some have claimed.

The young men who 188.the crime came from countries without democratic rights and freedoms, with no 189.....to express their views in open debate, no easy way of changing their190....., no opportunity for choice and well aware that the West often supported those autocratic rulers. For them, as for many others, an external .191.....was, I believe, a unifying way of addressing some of their own frustrations.

Of course some 192.....for al-Qaeda have enjoyed the freedom of living in the West, the right to vote, to speak out, to 193.in political debate. They have in many cases received subsidised 194.education, free 195.care and lived with considerable material possessions. They have enjoyed human rights and freedom under the 196. So what unites them with the 197.and unfree end of the terrorist spectrum? It is the view, exemplified by the Palestinians' plight, but not only that, that the West has 198.and occupied Muslim lands –199- often supported dictators, and killed its citizens. The Crusades are not forgotten. And we believe that it was the arrival of American 200.in the holy lands of Saudi Arabia, that first 201.....Osama Bin Laden to attack the West, 202.the USA, and to 203. a global jihad. Indeed the 204. stated aims of al-Qaeda are to remove the United States and its 205.from the Arab lands, to depose apostate rulers and to restore the Islamic form of government known as the 206.

It would, though, be wrong to suggest that all terrorists belonging to al-Qaeda, or its 207., or merely inspired by it, share an identical motivation. But a 208.narrative compelling to some, seems to 209., namely that it is the 210.of good Muslims to 211.jihad against the West, to avenge their Palestinian co-religionists, and more recently those in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as 212.

If you watch the chilling video wills made by the British 7/7 213....., or those convicted in London for the 214.plot of 2006 to destroy a series of transatlantic aircraft, to mark the fifth anniversary of 9/11, it is clear that their perception of 215.is the main motive. I also think that, for some, 216.some third generation Britons, the prospect of 217.with al-Qaeda followers offers them a sense of identity and a 218.which they mistakenly think is 219.in a society they may find 220. I am 220.that many are not driven by the al-Qaeda ideology but by the attraction of belonging to a group, doing something exciting which gives a 221..... to their lives. 223.to the group then becomes the main motivation. And, of course, those committed to the cause are unscrupulous about 224.and grooming young and vulnerable people for terrorist

acts.

When we 225.back to the United 226....., two days after 9/11, up the eastern seaboard of the United States, the smoke from the fires in New York was 227.visible. We felt alone in the skies above America. On the long flight home we discussed the 228..... of further attacks and what could be done to prevent them, and how the United States and the rest of the world would 229..... The sympathy with what America had suffered was profound and 230.and most nations expressed it and offered solidarity and support.

What was clear is that there had been a graphic and 231.....illustration of what a few determined individuals could 232.....to bring terror not only to North America but also 233..... America felt vulnerable. We all did.

Airline bookings dropped, capital cities were 234....., holidays cancelled. 235.....of mind was broken, 236.....temporarily. For the United Kingdom and my service, what followed was a time of great anxiety and tension, as floods of information 237.....us. Was a copy-cat attack to be launched on Canary Wharf? How should the government deal with an 238.....passenger aircraft known to be under terrorist control, or, 239.....in terms of decision making, suspected of so 240.....? Where would al-Qaeda hit next? What defences could we 241.? What could we do to reduce apprehension and to 242.....our citizens to continue their lives, as far as possible free from fear? What could we anticipate? Which of the flood of leads should we 243.....? Which put to one 234.....?

That presented us with 235.....choices. We could not pursue everything yet knew that what we 236.....could develop into a potent 237. Research was in hand to revisit old leads and to reinterpret old information in the 238.....of these new events.

But, looking back, I think that those of us working in intelligence and security were 239. We had a clear 240. and we were extremely focused. We did not share that feeling of 241.which, in addition to fear, terrorism can bring to people. We knew what we all had to do, to strengthen our intelligence 242.....to try to anticipate and 243.....the terrorists.

My 244..... was that staff would exhaust themselves, so driven was everyone by their understanding of the 245.....of the threat.

One of the first things we did was to 246..... in London a meeting of heads, or their 247....., of European security services, all well known to us, and 248. colleagues. A senior US intelligence official travelled to London to 249.....us and our European friends on the 251.....given its horrific backdrop, was not unique. Security and intelligence services regularly meet to exchange views, share concerns and work together.

The Americans, whose intelligence collection efforts dwarf most others, are generous. Sharing intelligence is not always straightforward because of differing 252..... and legal frameworks, but at that meeting we were all among friends 253.....we trusted. Most of those present had had their own experiences of terrorism, and 254.....had further manifestations of al-Qaeda related terror to deal with.

We, for example, in the United Kingdom had had to deal with Palestinian, Syrian, Libyan, Moroccan and Algerian terrorists, to name but a 255. Our most significant experience was, of course, with terrorism stemming from 256.....

That had 257. us for years. Some of the things we 258.....are relevant to thinking about the very different threat from al-Qaeda. One is the belief that the divisions in Northern Ireland society, manifested in terrorism, could not be solved 259. Nor could intelligence and 260.....work, however successful in preventing attacks and informing government, resolve those divisions, although that work could buy time for a political process. Intelligence was critical in helping ministers 261.....that process, the aim of which was to reach long term political resolutions with 262.....who had prosecuted the terrorist campaign. But it took many years and extraordinary 263.....by politicians, especially the Prime Minister, Tony Blair and the Irish Taoiseach, Bertie Aherne, to reach that point. And peace only came, at least largely peace, when the two ends of the political spectrum, Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist party, reached agreement.

In the garden of the British Embassy in Washington on the day after 9/11, we 264. the near certainty of a war in Afghanistan to destroy the al-Qaeda bases there and drive out the terrorists and 265.....sponsors, the Taliban. We all saw that as necessary. And in Afghanistan documents and 266. laboratories were discovered showing the terrorists' 267.....interest in fulfilling Bin Laden's stricture to 268..... and use nuclear material.

What I think none of us 269. at that stage was that the unity of purpose directed at 270..... further success by al-Qaeda would be tested by the decision of the United States, supported by the UK and others, after the rout of the Taliban in Afghanistan, to invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein certainly allowed no freedom. His human rights record was atrocious, his prisons 271.....chambers. He was a ruthless dictator and the world is 272.....off without him. But 273.....he nor his regime had anything to do with 9/11 and 274.....an extensive search for links, none but the most trivial and insignificant was found.275....., for the secular Saddam Hussein, al-Qaeda represented a 276.....to his authority.

The invasion of Iraq polarised international opinion. Many 277. its legality. Incidentally, my own father, Attorney-General at the time of Suez, 278.....the British Government then that its attack on Egypt was illegal in international law.

War was declared on a 279..... state, an easier target than an elusive terrorist group based mainly, at that stage, in the difficult 280.....of the Afghan-Pakistan border, and, in my view, whatever the merits of putting an end to Saddam Hussein, the war was also a distraction from the 281.....of al-Qaeda. It increased the terrorist threat by convincing more people that Osama Bin Laden's claim that Islam was under attack was correct. It 282.....an arena for the jihad for which he had called, so that many of his supporters, including British citizens, travelled to Iraq to attack 283.....forces. It also showed very clearly that 284.....and domestic policy are 285.....- actions overseas have an impact at home. And our 286..... in Iraq spurred some young British Muslims to 287.....to terror.

9/11 was a 288.....crime on a vast 289..... It propelled Bin Laden and his supporters into the consciousness of the 290. world. It altered our perception of what terrorism could achieve. It led to the 291. of like-minded terrorists across the globe from Spain to Indonesia, from Kenya to Canada, from Pakistan to the Netherlands. It led to massive expenditure by the West as it 292..... to defend itself. And what now? Eighteen months ago, I predicted that the so-called "war on terror" would not be 293.....but that the threat would mutate and 294.....moderate.

I note that the threat level in the United Kingdom and to British interests 295.....was lowered 296..... in the summer. It is probably too soon to be able to 297..... with any confidence the effect of Bin Laden's 298..... But I do not expect terrorism as a tool, often used by states in earlier 299., now used largely by groups, to disappear. And I very much 300.that my former colleagues are relaxed about the continuing threat from al-Qaeda and its sympathisers.

But the Northern Ireland example, so 301..... different as it is, and even with the recent worrying 302..... in dissident terrorist activity, should encourage us to hope that peace between hostile 303. is possible. Who could have thought - I certainly didn't - that we would see Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness, Chief Minister and Deputy Minister respectively, 304.....together on a sofa while promoting trade in North America?

And maybe, just maybe the death of Bin Laden, the excitement of the Arab Spring, the possibility of a new and more 305..... generation of Muslim leaders, may mean that we see less al-Qaeda 306..... terrorism. The investment in intelligence and its 307., of which more in my next lecture, the attrition the terrorists have

suffered, the changing politics of the Middle East all give some cause for optimism. I am also 308..... that most people refuse to give the victory to the terrorists 309..... by being intimidated or by supporting the diminution of our 310.....liberties. Ten years on from 9/11, the fear that afflicted us then has faded – 311..... it has certainly not disappeared.

(audience applause)

SUE LAWLEY: Eliza Manningham-Buller, thank you very much indeed for that. Now we have with us here in the Radio Theatre in Broadcasting House an invited 312.....made up of experts and interested parties from 313..... walks: politicians, writers, activists, 314.....figures in the Muslim community and members of the intelligence and security services too. Now who will ask the first question? Can I ... Here we are.

PETER HENNESSEY: Thank you, Sue. Peter Hennessy, Queen Mary University of London, cross-bench peer in the House of Lords. Thank you, Eliza. That was a terrific 315..... Can I ask you though a general question, a question about the intelligence officer's 316..... If a new 317..... to your old service, MI5, said, "Tell me, please distil the essence of your craft", what would you tell him or her?

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: I think it's a 318..... in discovering what the truth of a situation is, by seeking through clear legal 319. to discover the intentions of people who do us 320..... I worked with people who were motivated by the determination to try and protect the citizens of this country from attack. And the sort of people were very 321..... I don't think you can produce a 322..... person. You 323..... expect objectivity, regard for the law, integrity, a 324..... of intelligence, analytical ability. I'm not pretending I had all those 325....., but that's what you ideally look for.

SUE LAWLEY: We're going to come to the front row here, and I see Shami Chakrabarti, Director of Liberty. Yes, Shami?

SHAMI CHAKRABARTI: I agree with you that the twin towers atrocity was a 326.....; not the start of a war, but a crime. Can I take it that you agree with me that the way that we respond to crimes, heinous crimes as well as common crimes, is 327. the rule of law, not 328..... it?

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: The democracies of the West believe in the rule of law and we 329..... prosecute these crimes within 330..... law.

SUE LAWLEY: And you said 331.....the 332..... of your lecture that you disliked intensely the phrase "war on terror". Did you ever say that? Did you ever 333.

..... George Bush say it in person and did you say to him, “I just don’t think that’s a very good 334.....”?

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: I said I didn’t 335..... it myself and I didn’t like it.

SUE LAWLEY: You’ve made it very clear you deeply disapproved of it.

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: I only met the President 336....., and that was at a banquet at Buckingham Palace. That wasn’t the moment to tell him what I thought about that. *(laughter)*

SUE LAWLEY: Did you ever transmit down the 337. that you thought it was a really bad idea to 338. about war on terror?

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: Certainly within the British Government. But you know it’s the Americans’ decision to call it that. I think we hope that we didn’t call it that in this country. That was my 339.

SUE LAWLEY: *(over)* But do you feel it led to an overreaction in the 340..... of 9/11?

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: I think that that’s quite a difficult question because we can all remember what it was like. It almost felt that you couldn’t overreact at that stage. I think since that time we’ve seen it in better perspective, but it’s hard to be judgemental when 341.....an atrocity happens on your 342.....

SUE LAWLEY: Gentleman there.

ROBERT FOX: Robert Fox, Evening Standard and the Centre for 343..... Studies at King’s College. There was a very big media narrative for action following very 344.....the war on terror agenda. But for that, could you, for example, have 345..... to have done 346..... nothing militarily and waited for al-Qaeda to show its hand and make its next 347.....?

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: I was not 348..... that we should do nothing militarily. I actually supported the war in Afghanistan. I think it’s 349..... very hard for political leaders to do nothing when 350..... by public opinion and an event like that. You couldn’t possibly have expected the American Government to do nothing. They Were351..... to do something. Of course they were.

SUE LAWLEY: I’m going to try and move us on, if I may, to an 352..... that you talked about, which is home-grown British terrorism, and I know we’ve got Hanif Qadir in the 353..... who’s actively involved in 354.....in the prevention of violent extremism. I think

he knows young Muslims who've their heads have been 355..... to be turned.

HANIF QADIR: Thank you very much. Some of my opinions that I had about yourself and the services, you've 356..... eloquently removed those negative perceptions that I had, so thank you very much for that. I work very 357..... with young people who are either vulnerable to terrorist 358..... or have been recruited and have served time in 359.....

If we came across a potential Mohammed Sidique Khan who was preparing to attack UK 360., but with our experience we felt that we could change this person's 361..... and stop him from doing that - we're not 362..... to intervene in that because it's a matter of 363..... - wouldn't it be right for us to intervene if we can save, one, him from attacking the UK; but number two, 364..... information about him and his network; and, number three, to save him from going to prison for a very long time?

SUE LAWLEY: We should say that Mohammed Sidique Khan was the leader of the 7/7 bombers.

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: You believe that if you discovered this person, your obligation would be to report them to the authorities and that would be it?

HANIF QADIR: 365....., yes.

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: I don't see why the two are exclusive. I mean you might 367..... to alert authorities to the potential of this young man, but obviously it's in everybody's interests that he's 368.....from the route he's on, so I can't believe that anybody would wish to stop you doing that. It seems to me to be an 369. thing to do.

SUE LAWLEY: I'm going to take a question just there.

IAN McEWAN: Ian McEwan. I'm a novelist. To what 370..... were there tensions between British and American intelligence services as your kinds of views - as I assume they did - 371..... across the Atlantic?
How did that work in the 372. relationship or in the relationship?

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: The relationship between different nations,373.on

diplomatic channels or intelligence channels, starts from a position that we often have different 374..... to each other. That's understood. Not everybody in the West thinks the same. I might have different views with my 375.....colleague. The American relationship is special to the degree that the Americans have much more intelligence and substance than 376..... else, but my American friends would not necessarily expect to agree with me or vice-versa. That is not necessary to 377.on intelligence terms.

SUE LAWLEY: I've got a question that's been 378..... in, but I'm sure he'd prefer to ask it in person, from Tony Brenton, former British Ambassador to Moscow.

TONY BRENTON: I was actually in Washington on 9/11 and in 379..... of the embassy through the Iraq War. You will 380..... that at the time the intelligence agencies were 381..... that Saddam Hussein was developing weapons of mass destruction. This was a 382....., but that was the case. And not just as it were the 383. intelligence agencies. The Russians, the French, the Germans were 384.convinced. If Saddam had been getting close to acquiring 385..... of mass destruction, given the mess that we had seen could be made with perfectly conventional weapons, 386..... we not have been right to take the action that we took?

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: There are 387..... of countries who are developing weapons of mass destruction who we do not attack. Your question is 388..... I mean there wouldn't have been the 389..... that there has been if those weapons had been 390.....

TONY BRENTON: *(over)* But they weren't.

SUE LAWLEY: *(over)* But would it have been the right thing to do is really the thrust of the question, isn't it?

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: Well it is the thrust of it. I mean it's the 391.question about when you decide to 392..... and when you don't. I understand why we went into Iraq. There was a view that it was no longer tolerable 394. us through their acquisition of weapons in the light of what had happened. What I objected to was the suggestion that this had anything to do with 9/11, and actually that it distracted us from the focus on the perpetrators of 9/11.

SUE LAWLEY: We've spoken a lot about America and we've got an American over there. Let me hear from him. Your name, sir?

CHARLIE WOLF: Yes, Charlie Wolf. I'm an American political commentator and 395. based here in London. As there has been a bit of a narrative concerning Iraq as being a diversion, if I may just very 396. rebut by saying that I think the American position was that it was taking the 397. from American soil and occupied it on our own terms in Iraq.

SUE LAWLEY: Let me just have a quick 398..... on that: they set the agenda, so it was worth doing; it wasn't a distraction.

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: *(over)* Could I just 399. what I think you're saying. Are you saying that to attract into Iraq al-Qaeda and deal with them there, that that was a war 400.?

CHARLIE WOLF: That was one of the things that was 401..... It did set the battle to where we decided. 402..... of waiting for the next attack in the United States and going on al-Qaeda or others' terms, America was 403..... to then set its terms as to where it wanted to 404.....

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: Gentlemen there with his hand up.

PETER TAYLOR: Peter Taylor, BBC. Eliza, you 405.....rightly drew the lessons from Ireland that we were able to 406..... an accommodation 407.....because we engaged with the enemy, we talked to the IRA 408.....your service and your sister service. Al-Qaeda is a very different organisation. To 409. do you talk in al-Qaeda and what do you talk 500.....?

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: Those are 501.....key questions. I don't know the answers to them. What I think is that 502..... - I don't know - that thinking about the answers to those questions is something that is 503. happening. But to say that you're never going to speak to them or never going to try to, I think that's 504.....

PETER TAYLOR: You've made it quite clear that there are 505..... areas of their agenda like Western American presence in Muslim lands, the Palestinian question. Those kind of 506....., I would have thought, do offer some possibility for discussion?

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: I mean we're obviously a great deal away from anything that you could call a 507., even if that were possible, but to think about these questions and to make 508. to try and have those conversations must be a starter.

SUE LAWLEY: Are we 509. today than we were ten years ago?

ELIZA MANNINGHAM-BULLER: I hope so, but we're never 510. safe. You cannot 511.exactly what's going to happen next week or 512. it. That's a very 513..... position to be in if you're a 514. or if you're an intelligence officer. Many is the time I've gone to bed 515..... that we've known a bit about a terrorist attack, but not enough to preempt it, not 516..... to be able to take precautions; knowing something was coming but not knowing when or where. And I hope we're 517....., but it's a dangerous world.

SUE LAWLEY: There we have to leave it. Next week we'll be in Leeds where Lady Manningham-Buller will be discussing the need for a security service and analysing its role and its 518..... For now my thanks to you, the audience, and to our Reith Lecturer: Eliza Manningham-Buller. From the Radio Theatre, goodbye.

(audience applause)

END