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Evaluating administrative burdens through SCM:  
some indications from the Italian experience

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# Evaluating administrative burdens through SCM: some indications from the Italian experience<sup>•</sup>

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## Abstract

A methodology to measure administrative burdens, based on the Dutch Standard Cost Model (SCM), has been applied in a large number of European countries, coupled in most cases with the commitment to a reduction target. This paper compares the application of the method in different national context and discusses its weaknesses and strengths against more complete forms of evaluation of the adequacy of regulation. The paper also discusses some indication arisen during the measurement of administrative burdens through SCM in Italy. Our main conclusion is that the SCM is a potentially useful tool and could provide motivation for culture change in policymaking. Its major strength, which lies mainly in its pragmatic approach and the possibility of commitment on a quantitative target, may be at the same time a source of weakness and may deliver some misleading results. Also some basic concepts of the model need a more rigorous definition to be consistently applied in different countries.

**Keywords:** administrative burdens, better regulation, costs of regulation, European governance, standard cost model.

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## 1. Introduction.

“Better regulation” or “better lawmaking” is a complex process that covers policy making, from its initial conception through to its appraisal, implementation and enforcement (starting with the careful application of the principle of subsidiarity) and embraces reform of regulatory policies, processes, and Institutions. Better regulation is one the pillars of the Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs. At the same time empirical evidence suggests a negative relationship between the intensity of regulation and productivity. However, so far the progress achieved were limited due to the complexity of the task and the lack of real political support.

As some commentators have noted (for example Radaelli, 2007), there has been some misunderstanding about the real meaning of better regulation. While, taken literally, better regulation pointed to an improvement in the overall quality of rules (existing and new) based mainly on economic analysis (with Regulatory Impact Analysis, RIA), consultation and rule making (regulatory management and processes), the term has been also used to mean ‘*lighter regulation*’. This view is implicitly embedded for example in many of the cross country indicators that are provided by various international institutions<sup>1</sup>. The first decade of this century has seen a growing interest in this second meaning of better regulation, possibly due to increasing scepticism on the possibility of delivering perfect regulation. Worries about the costs and burdens of regulation, viewed as sources of inefficiencies in the economic system, have become more and more important, particularly in Europe (both at member states and EU level). Accordingly a growing interest surrounded initiatives to evaluate and cut costs of regulation when possible.

A considerable amount of work has been carried out at the OECD to date (OECD, 2003, 2006 and 2007). Some coordination at the EU level emerged spontaneously in this area around the Cost Model (SCM). The SCM has been developed to provide a simplified, consistent method for estimating the administrative burdens imposed on business by public

authorities. Initially developed in the Netherlands, the SCM has also been extensively applied in Denmark and UK among other countries and is the most widely applied methodology for measuring administrative costs. In 2003, a network of countries was formed to consistently apply the SCM across the EU<sup>ii</sup>. The initiative has been stepped up by the EU Commission with its version of the SCM, the Net Administrative Cost Model (EU-SCM), aimed at establishing a common methodology to be used in the EU to deliver comparable results<sup>iii</sup>.

From the operational point of view, according to the Dutch manual<sup>iv</sup>, the researcher should identify the relevant Information Obligation (IO), i.e. the piece of information required by the regulation, assess its cost and the frequency of the requirement across the economy.

At the root of this initiatives is a focus on some relatively new notions of the burden to be measured that is instrumental to the possibility of cutting it afterward. Administrative cost are *"... the costs incurred by enterprises, the voluntary sector, public authorities and citizens in meeting legal obligations to provide information on their activities (or production), either to public authorities or to private parties"*. It has to be remarked that *"... some of the procedures in place have become needlessly time-consuming, excessively complicated or useless... Unnecessary and disproportionate administrative costs severely hamper economic activity.* The analysis should distinguish between *"information that would be collected by businesses even in the absence of the legislation and information that would not be collected without the legal provisions. The former are called administrative costs; the latter administrative burdens.* The UK Better Regulation Executive branded the difference between the two classes of costs as *'business as usual'* costs, i.e. costs of activities which businesses would be likely to carry out regardless of the regulation in place (for example, businesses would continue to keep some type of accounts even without legislation, see Coco, 2006 and Torriti, 2007).

Recently the European Commission underlined the importance of measuring the unnecessary administrative burdens (AB) which are likely to

*"... hamper growth and inhibit innovation. Removing them will allow companies to spend more time on core business activities, thereby increase labour efficiency which will benefit productivity and reduce production costs ..."* <sup>v</sup>

Thus, the SCM is a model designed to identify and quantify the AB arising from regulation over a certain period of time, in a way that provides insight and detail and allows for comparison of the figures. The tool has a microeconomic purpose (is targeted to ex ante impact assessment and ex post simplification). The results from the SCM measurements are directly applicable in connection with the governments' simplification efforts, in that the results shows which specific regulations and in details which parts of the regulation are especially burdensome for businesses.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes briefly the EU experience and the shift of emphasis towards simplification policies. Section 3 discusses the Italian measurement (still ongoing) in detail and some useful lesson following from it. Section 4 compares exercises conducted in different EU countries mainly from a methodological point of view. Section 5 discusses the overall evidence on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the SCM as a policy tool. Section 6 concludes.

## **2. The EU experience.**

The first initiatives on "better regulation" were launched in the Edinburgh European summit of December 1992. The Commission launched a multi-annual project in 1996 to streamline key Internal Market Legislation, "Simplification of legislation for the internal market" (SLIM). In July 2001 the Commission committed itself to action on improving the quality of EU legislation (White Paper on European Governance), and in June 2002 adopted an Action Plan "Simplifying and improving the regulatory environment"<sup>vi</sup>. In December 2003, an Inter-institutional Agreement (IIA) on Better Law-Making, established a global strategy for better lawmaking throughout the entire EU legislative process<sup>vii</sup>.

Increasingly, countries noted the importance of Better Regulation for competitiveness and economic growth (Blanchard & Giavazzi 2001, Cincera & Galgau 2005, Djankov et. al, 2006).

In the European Spring Summit in Lisbon (march 2000), the quality of regulation become one the pillars of the EU's ambitious 'Lisbon Strategy' for growth and jobs. Subsequent summits gave the Commission a renewed mandate to develop "a strategy for further coordinated action to simplify the regulatory environment". In this phase the European approach differs from the American one as the emphasis is on laws rather than on executive acts and focuses on a broader analysis of all relevant impacts of policy options rather than on pure cost benefit analysis (Hahn & Litan 2005, Wiener 2006). However the Commission has also started to pay particular attention to partial impact analysis and to potential administrative costs and burdens resulting from EU law.

In occasion of the re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, this process resulted in a strong acceleration to the simplification process with the Commission communication 'Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the EU', and the launch of the "Rolling Programme"<sup>viii</sup>, initially covering the period 2005-2008. Since then, simplification effort have been considerably upgraded at Member State level. As the EU's better regulation agenda is gradually being put into place, 19 Member States have introduced or are about to develop a Better Regulation Strategy and 12 Member states have identified this issue as a key challenge in their agenda.

A coherent approach to a new culture of policy making requires an integrated approach including systematic simplification programmes, specific national targets, compliance incentives, regular consultation of stakeholders, monitoring and enforcing mechanisms, institutional structures which would allow for a rigorous implementation of the system<sup>ix</sup>.

However, action at national level has been limited to the setting up of better regulation tools, often without a real change in regulatory process and with limited impact on the business environment. The National Reform Programmes (NRP) evidenced that only few of the originally promising

simplification plans have already resulted in explicit measures. The contribution of stakeholders to the policy making process varies widely across the Member States and there is room for substantial improvement.

Looking ahead, more promising results are expected from programmes aimed directly at reducing administrative costs. During 2006, the European Commission designed and launched an Act Programme for Reducing Administrative Burdens in the European Union (COM (2007)23). In 2007 the Programme was then endorsed by the Spring Council that specifically agreed to the joint reduction target of 25% of burdens by 2012 stemming from EU legislation and its transposition into national law. EU leaders agreed to this goal but discarded the idea of binding targets at national level. According to European Commission estimates, AB imposed by government (applications, forms, statistics) amount to around 3.5% of EU GDP, meaning that a 25% cut could produce a €150 billion boost to the European economy<sup>x</sup> through saving for the enterprise system.

The 9<sup>th</sup> October 2007 the Council (Ecofin) Conclusions recalled the mandate on the reduction of administrative burdens and, in particular, underlined the importance of ensuring that the needs of SMEs and newly created enterprises are fully considered in this context. At the same time, *"... the Presidency considers that the need for an adequate balance between costs and benefits should be taken into account in the overall effort of measuring and reducing administrative burdens ..."*.

Following the mandate of the EU Council, the Commission started the implementation of the project<sup>xi</sup>. The Action Programme will also examine how EU IO have been transposed into national legislation. For carrying out the above assignment, after a complex competitive procedure, the Commission awarded an important Service Contract to a Contractor<sup>xii</sup>. The project started in July 2007 and the measurement has been finalised during the course of 2008. The results of the EC measurement should be available to member states by the end of 2008, and the EC and the Contractor tried to organise themselves in order to achieve the important objectives foreseen, taking into account the complexity of the work and the very

limited timeframe considered for the assignment (18 months). At present a number of relevant issues are affecting the EC exercise, with particular reference to the relations between the activities of the Contractor and the contribution of the State members. There is the risk that they might hamper and jeopardise the EC exercise. In particular, taking into account the Italian case, these are the main issues:

- It is still unclear what should be the exact contribution of the member state: indeed the Terms of Reference (ToR) provided by the EC make reference to the validation of the IO pre-mapping provided by the Contractor but it is not defined the in-depth of this activity.
- The ToR are vague about the degree to which national regulation were to be surveyed. There are hints that the Contractor suggests to consider only primary legislation as a source of AB. This would be misleading. Most details about the burdens are in secondary norms (Ministerial Decrees in particular) and excluding them from the mapping process may (have) deliver(-ed) a highly incomplete picture of the real AB. It must be remembered that within the SCM, details are the substance matter.
- There seems to be an important underestimation of the complexity of the SCM in terms of getting suitable data and information upon figures (quality and quantity of business) and the transposition in the country of the EC regulation.
- An important component of the transposition in the country of the EC regulation affecting companies is placed at regional and municipality level. At present s unclear how to manage this multi-level governance issue which is crucial in the Italian experience of implementing effectively the SCM method.

At Member states level, the number of States which have set a quantitative target has doubled in 2007 with respect to the previous year (ten Member States, AT, DE, DK, EL, ES, IT, NL, SE, SK, UK have set a 25% national reduction target, while another two Member States, CZ and FR, set



a target of 20%). Most Member States have so far carried out baseline measurement of administrative burdens using the same measurement methodology (SCM), while others are currently conducting them (AT, DE, FR, SE).

Italy agreed upon setting a national target for a reduction of 25%, to be achieved at national level (on regulation with "pure" national or regional origin) by 2012 <sup>xiii</sup>. The importance and the commitment to this "national target" as part of the Italian simplification strategy has been improved by its adoption in primary legislation in August 2008 (art. 25 of Law 133/08). In particular all the national administrations are obliged to be part of the measurement exercise in order to achieve the EU and national targets.

### 3. The Italian experience

From June 2005 to November 2006, Italy completed its first pilot project (MOA - *Misurazione oneri amministrativi*) to test the Dutch Standard Cost Model. The project was coordinated by the Department of Public Administration (*Office for Simplification in Public Administrations*) in the Prime Minister Office, in collaboration with the Italian School of Public Administration (SSPA). On that occasion, MOA (or the SCM Italian version) was applied on 19 cases of permits and other administrative obligations for the exercise of business activities, in different economic sectors, such as "public procurement", "annual reporting" (Olive oil production, Nurseries for vegetables), "Road freight transport" (in connection with the RTS OECD project), "naval transport", VAT and *privacy* requirements for SMEs.

At the beginning of 2007 and in connection with the first Italian Annual Simplification Plan, the Italian Government launched a new national Multi-annual Plan (2007-2010) for the Measurement of Administrative Costs and quantitative reduction of AB for enterprises. The IOs arising for SMEs connected to national regulation (areas of Environment, Fire Security and prevention, Landscape Protection and Labour and Social Security) were selected on the basis of the simplification priorities expressed by Inter

Ministerial Committee in its Annual Action Plan, in consultation with stakeholders and taking into account the EC strategy. The Department of Public Administration and the Simplification Unit (PMO) coordinate the Plan. The National Statistic Office (ISTAT) is involved in the sample selection process, in the design of the method and the direct implementation of the measurement survey.

The structure of the Italian SCM has changed quite considerably between the experimental phase and the actual implementation of the first program of measurement. This change follows directly from the lessons learned during the experimental phase. Two issues arose forcefully to the attention of the researchers. On one side the sheer size of the heterogeneity in the population of firms was reflected in a wide variety of estimates of the burden associated with a certain administrative activity. This was reduced by repeated interaction with the firms interviewed, but only to a limited extent. The ideal presented in the SCM manuals in which a 4 out of 5 firms were actually revealing comparable costs, whose average could therefore be deemed to be close to the cost of the 'normally efficient business', seldom occurred.

This prompted another consideration about the particular structure of the Italian firms. Indeed, the existence of 4,5 millions registered SMEs (of which, around 4 million below 5 employees), makes the Italian situation almost unique. On one side this makes it more urgent for Italy to run an appropriate program of AB reduction. It is an accepted fact that the AB and more in general compliance costs, weights disproportionately on small firms mainly because there are economies of scale in the related activities. A country with fragmented firms' structure therefore stands to gain potentially much more from cost reduction than one with a concentrated structure. AS a consequence the Italian SCM program focused only on SMEs, on which all the substantial gains are to be found. In addition, due to the huge number of SME, it is unreasonable to suppose that it is possible to estimate the cost of the 'normally efficient business' once for all classes, with 5 interviews. Stratification of the population is clearly one answer. All Italian estimates

have been carried out only on SMEs and are based on two separate surveys. An indirect survey for firms for Micro firms (defined as firms with 1 to 5 employees) and a direct one for larger SME (5-249 employees). Also a statistically sounder approach appeared necessary.

Furthermore some problems arose in the sample selection process. Participation in the survey was difficult to secure in particular for micro firms. The easiest route to ensure a reasonable level of compliance was to obtain a backing of the initiative from business associations. However even then most small firms were unaware of the burdens associated with most administrative activities, simply because the vast majority of them were actually externalising all of the administrative activities. Notably, the most important providers of those services are the very business associations involved in the measurement. This prompted the consideration that a biased selection of the sample through business association might severely affect the credibility of the estimate. Of course, a similar problem of credibility exists when firms are directly chosen by the government and particularly if chosen by the regulatory agency. This is the reason why those tasks are better allocated to a third structure not directly involved neither to business association nor to the regulatory agency. In Italy this structure has been identified in the national statistic institute (ISTAT). This choice seemed to fit also the need to develop a sound statistical approach based on the representativeness of single firms interviewed in terms of their relevant characteristics.

Externalising the survey did not solve the problem of micro firms, defined as the business with less than 5 employees (which actually weren't able to answer the detailed questionnaire for the reasons above). Excluding micro firms from the survey would certainly deliver a biased results. The solution adopted has been to gather information on micro firms burdens indirectly, through 'expert assessment' and to aggregate the obtained estimates with the results delivered by ISTAT on the sample of single-location firms from 5 to 249 employees.

Building a good quality, reliable sample, is one of the most difficult steps of the analysis. The sample size chosen for each regulatory area is about 40/50 firms. For simplicity, samples of the same size are taken for each measurement, independently from the subject regulation. The pilot project evidenced that in the Italian context, characterized by considerable heterogeneity in the population of firms, a sample of 4 or 5 firms was meaningless. In selecting the sample size, it must be taken into account that the time needed to investigate and correct the impact of outliers could largely exceed the time needed for conducting higher number of surveys.

ISTAT selects the sample in two steps: first it conducts a basic telephone survey on a sufficiently large number of firms (roughly 1000 per regulatory area), distributed uniformly over the national territory. This survey is aimed at estimating the number and type of businesses that are required to comply with the specific activities involved. Companies are asked to provide information over the last three years, ending with 2006. This first step is also important to identify the relevant population when some IO do not involve the whole population of enterprises affected by the regulation but only firms that undertake some specific action (for ex. participating in a tender, opening a new venue or installing new equipment).

The second step consists in direct interviews to a smaller number of businesses (40-50). Businesses are selected obviously among those that have complied with at least one administrative burden in the relevant year. The sample has been constructed using a balancing technique aimed at guaranteeing the presence of a minimum number of businesses for each region, type of administrative burden, size, presence of internal and external costs and sector of activity. A statistical model has been used to extrapolate results from the sample to the population. The model uses some auxiliary variables (number of enterprises, number of employees, sector of economic activity, geographic distribution) to assign a weight  $W_k$  for each enterprise  $k$  of the sample. Questionnaires and interviews guides were prepared for each regulation subject. The questionnaires were reviewed and discussed in a focus group before being sent out for use by the local statistic

office interviewers. Interviewers undertook a training programme to understand the purpose of the project and the way to collect information and complete the questionnaires. To facilitate measurements, reduce errors and ensure a greater homogeneity of the results, national experiences show the value of a database and the importance to fix some “standard” value for recurrent costs (filling a form, posting it etc.). The same issue will most likely arise at the EU-level.

ISTAT does not provide data on the appropriate wage for relevant occupational group. Eight employee types were identified as typically working in SMEs. The cost applied on each type is the average hourly wage provided by the same businesses interviewed, including a 25% uplift for overhead costs, in accordance with the SCM.

External costs are the fees paid to external advisers, collected in the interviews with businesses and verified in a focus group with accountants and professional advisers. In particular, professionals can provide more information than businesses regarding the distribution of total costs among the specific administrative activities.

In cases where the frequency was not identifiable in a prescribed mandatory periodicity, it was estimated on the basis of the occurrences revealed during the interviews, and verified on the basis of administrative information. The cost for each administrative burden is the sum of internal and external costs.

The final aim of the methodology is to determine the administrative costs of a “typical” firm, that means avoiding the impact on the results of exceptional and not representative businesses on the estimate. The methodological issues and the criteria for identifying “abnormal” values, however, are not explicated in a satisfactory way in international SCM manuals. The choice of values that have to be excluded from the measurement is largely discretionary and can produce inconsistent and non-homogeneous results.

In Italy, in the first experimental phase the exclusion criterion chosen was a measure of the distance from the mean. This concept of “abnormal”,

borrowed from statistical theory, was only meant to provide a standard and homogeneous criterion to limit user discretion. In statistical terms however, the concept can be operatively better captured using the median (that, in general, is insensitive to “outliers”), rather than the average cost. However, for very small samples the median is a less reliable statistical indicator. ISTAT uses the median of the total burden, but calculates also average values to control and investigate for eventual excessive anomalies.

The results of the first AB measurement in Italy, in the areas identified by the Italian Annual Simplification Plan (PAS) of 2007, are summarized in table 1<sup>2</sup>. The estimate of the total administrative cost imposed to business by national regulation in the areas selected amount to over 16 billion euros per year. Most of these costs are concentrated in the areas of labour and social security. The administrative costs imposed by environment regulation amount to over 2 billion of euros. It must be noticed that these costs only include administrative burdens imposed by central government in the environmental sector, and do not take account of the significant burden imposed in this area by regulation at EU and at local level.

**Table 1 - Summary administrative cost by sector**  
(thousand euro, year 2006)

Sector	N. of employees		
	0-4	5-249	<b>0-249</b>
<b>Privacy</b>	n.d.	n.d.	2.190.431
<b>Environment</b>	1.540.382	518.807	2.059.189
<b>Fire prevention</b>	995.212	414.303	1.409.515
<b>Landscape and cultural goods</b>	550.817	70.583	621.400
<b>Labour</b>	5.858.048	1.052.596	6.910.644

<sup>2</sup> More detailed information are available on the web site of the Department for Public administration:  
[http://www.funzionepubblica.it/dipartimento/docs\\_pdf/MOA\\_2007\\_SINTESI\\_SCHEDE\\_MOA\\_DEF\\_\(09.05.08\).pdf](http://www.funzionepubblica.it/dipartimento/docs_pdf/MOA_2007_SINTESI_SCHEDE_MOA_DEF_(09.05.08).pdf)

<b>Social security</b>	1.832.710	1.196.833	3.029.542
<b>Total</b>	n.d.	n.d.	<b>16.220.722</b>

#### **4. A cross-country comparison of the application of the SCM method.**

##### **4.1. Different approaches to measurement and the possibility to undertake a useful benchmark.**

The number of countries that use the SCM has grown significantly in the last few years. Despite all these countries apply the same technique, some countries have made deliberate choices to deviate from the original SCM standard in the application. As stressed by the Dutch manual itself, the method is not static and it is important to let the single elements in the method to be constantly developed in line with the method being employed in new areas or in relation to new problems. That is why the manual has to be considered as a reference to address the most general issues and, keeping intact the fundamental principles, it will be updated with the method's continued development. In other terms the SCM is an open standard that can be, up to some points, customised or adapted to different circumstances.

Understanding the different methodologies used to carry out the SCM measurement is critical for the purpose of making comparisons or benchmarking between countries. This section illustrates some of the most relevant decisions on a number of central matters that have to be taken before applying SCM, discusses the possible options in the application of the technique comparing the experiences of several European countries, and evidences and explains some Italian choices<sup>xiv</sup>.

One of the most important points that must be addressed before starting comparison/benchmarking regards definitions. The definition of IO, regulation, business etc. is not obvious and need to be clarified. It is also

important to find an agreement on what has to be measured and what can be neglected, and on the way data have to be collected and reported.

First of all, since the SCM is aimed at measuring the administrative costs for private businesses, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by private businesses. The definition of private business is also necessary to identify the size of the population to be affected by a given rule. The traditional and narrow definition of private business is: "*units that produce and/or supply goods and/or services under market conditions with the objective of generating profit for the owners*". While Denmark, Sweden and Italy have employed this narrow definition of private businesses other countries have chosen a broader definition of "private business", including also "semiprivate" businesses, like charities and the voluntary sector (UK) or also public or partly public owned businesses that cover its own costs. (Netherlands). Norway extended the narrow definition to state corporations that perform regular business activities.

Differences among countries also arise in the definition of the regulation, whose administrative costs have to be measured. These differences are mainly due to differences in legal and political systems. In some countries, where a great part of the regulatory burden comes from non-legislative regulation (as approved codes of practice in UK, non-statutory schemes or agreements which the government has chosen to back rather than regulating), also part of these costs are included in the measurement. In Italy, as in the Netherlands and Denmark, the SCM is designed to measure the administrative costs arising from legislation (primary or secondary) only.

Another issue concerns the decision to measure the EU-Regulations when domestic implementation is not required. Most countries measure only EU regulation that are implemented in national legislation. This is not necessarily the most rational choice (in many cases also EU regulation that is formally directly applicable needs some domestic implementation) but is surely less resource demanding than the option of measuring all EU



Regulations. The UK decided to list and flag even if not to measure all EU regulation.

Different approaches were chosen also on whether to measure voluntary regulation or not. In principle, SCM should measure only administrative costs of compulsory regulations. Italy decided not to measure voluntary rules. However, there are cases in which rules are voluntary in theory but may be considered necessary in relation to entry, permanence or competition on the market, e.g. public procurement. Some countries (Denmark, Norway) measure the “necessary” voluntary rules, identified as the rules observed by the majority of the businesses that are covered by it. Sweden, the United Kingdom and Netherlands measure all voluntary rules.

Another decision that varies among countries regards the choice of measuring businesses’ IOs to the public sector only or including third parties information obligations (like employees or consumers, ex. food labelling of products, financial prospectus). Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden have measured both types of information obligations, while Italy (so far) and the United Kingdom only measure information obligations to the public sector.

In order to measure businesses’ administrative costs of regulations, it is important to establish clear assumptions about compliance. Not always a regulation is complied in full by all the businesses for which it is relevant. It may happen that the legislation is misunderstood by the businesses, or that the businesses consciously fail to follow parts of the provisions of the regulation. In these cases the costs of complying with a regulation may be different from the costs that the businesses actually incur. Most countries have decided to measure full compliance, with the aim to capture how businesses are supposed to follow the rule and what costs these businesses would bear in following all the rules that they are required to. Netherlands privileges the full compliance principle, but also measures with actual compliance when statistics about actual compliance are available. In carrying out their experimental measures, Italy has tried when possible to compare the measures obtained basing on actual compliance with those

under the hypothesis of full compliance (that are the centrepiece of the analysis anyway). The extent of the difference between the two measures can provide some further suggestion about the opportunity to simplify the regulation. When the businesses fail to comply with the regulation because it is too complex to be understood completely, or because is too "irritant to businesses", simplification of the rules can meet the double goal of reducing information costs and increasing the efficacy of the rule and the number of businesses that will comply with all parts of it.

In the cases where businesses receive some form of reimbursement of the administrative costs, it must be decided whether to include these costs in the measurement. Some countries, as Denmark, decided to exclude from the measurement IOs with cost-determined reimbursement. Other countries considers all IOs, but keep track of the level of reimbursement in order to take account of this information in the administrative cost measurements and to include such regulations on a net basis (United Kingdom, Netherlands). Including all IOs on a gross basis and reporting separately the size of reimbursement allows the evaluation both of the total impact of information obligations and the distribution of this impact between private businesses and the public sector. In Italy the issue is irrelevant: it is difficult to find cases in which businesses subjected receive such reimbursement.

It must be noticed that sometimes, the reduction of AB for firms could lead to an increase of cost for the public sector. In these cases where motivation of public interest would hinder or limit the possibility to reduce the burden for businesses simplifying the regulation, the reimbursement can be considered as a policy option to reduce the impact of AB on businesses.

Some countries use the SCM model to calculate the administrative costs to other groups than businesses, typically citizens and public authorities (the Netherlands for example). The approach used is similar to that used for businesses, but the analysis covers different aspects and may have different implications. Italy is planning to extend the analysis to citizen.

As evidenced above, one of the most difficult steps of the SCM analysis is to determine the administrative costs of a "typical" firm<sup>xv</sup>. The choice of the typical firm is aimed to avoid the impact on the results of exceptional and not representative businesses on the estimate. The methodological issues at the basis of identification and exclusion of abnormal values from the estimate are not explicated to a satisfactory point in international manuals. Italy, as other countries, use the median rather than the average cost.

As it happens this increases the importance of building a good quality sample of businesses to derive costs for a typical firm. Random samples have to be avoided. A sample that is statistically representative of the population affected by the regulation is not to be considered because the costs of constructing such a sample (and performing the survey) would greatly overcome the simplification potential. Moreover, the time involved would not be consistent with the time frame of the analysis.

In order to tackle the problem, some countries decided not to measure observations under a defined threshold limit. The criteria used to select the sample and the way each country account for these criteria differ among countries.

Denmark has set a lower threshold limit: laws which involve less than 100 hours administrative work per year for all businesses concerned are not measured. The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden have not set a formal threshold limit. Italy has not set a threshold limit on single parameters of the measurement, but has set a dimensional threshold limit of the businesses involved in the analysis. In a first stage the measurement will be carried out only on SMEs (up to 249 employee). The exclusion of large firms, is motivated partly by the structure of the firm population in Italy, where large firms are a negligible minority (less than 10,000 units). But mostly by the large amount of evidence in support of a regressive impact of AB. According to this view, red tape and compliance costs more in general are to some extent fixed costs and therefore weight more heavily on smaller firms<sup>xvi</sup>.

The “overhead costs”, the costs related to other factors than labour and that cover necessities linked to general administration (expenses for premises - rent or building depreciation -, telephone, heating, electricity, IT equipment, absence owing to illness etc.) are not easy to identify as there is no central statistical source that provides the necessary information. The overhead percentage varies among countries. Italy used an overhead percentage of 25 %, in analogy to other countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden). The Netherlands uses sometimes higher percentages.

In practice the SCM measures all administrative costs. Separating administrative costs from costs a company would incur also in absence of legislation (the “normal” business costs) would be too difficult to implement and it would not add much to the simplification process. Most countries have chosen not to make a formal distinction between normal business costs and administrative costs. Norway separate administrative costs from normal costs.

Different countries also use different approaches to assess if simplification succeeded in reducing administrative burden. The time horizon needed for simplification targets to be met is usually fixed more or less in three years. The frequency of the monitoring process differs among countries: the Netherlands carry out two monitoring exercises a year in order to know in advance if the targets are likely to be met in three years. Denmark intends to conduct annual measurements. The United Kingdom will use ex-ante assessments of new regulation as part of the post-implementation review process after three years.

#### **4.2. Possible challenges in the use of the methodology to measure administrative costs.**

The first step of the measurement consists in identifying the IOs inherent to the law under examination. These IOs may be further split into a number of pieces of information known as messages. In order to produce

this information, the businesses have to carry out a range of administrative activities that require internal resource in the form of use of employees' time and external resources in the form of fees for auditors, external experts and so on. Despite the basic calculations to determine the administrative costs for businesses are quite simple, the way to proceed to the measurement may be not so trivial and may differ among countries, leading to non-homogeneous results.

The basic formula for calculating the costs for the administration is quite simple:

$$\Sigma (\text{Price} \times \text{Quantity})$$

where the Price P represents the costs the companies incur in performing the activities, that is the product of Tariff x Time; the Tariff T, is the internal cost, that corresponds to the wage costs plus overhead for administrative activities done internally and the external cost, that is the hourly cost for external services providers; the Time required for carrying out the administrative activity, measured in hours (h). The variable Q represents the total time businesses spend each year to perform the administrative activities necessary to deliver the specific data requirement. It corresponds to the frequency that the activity must be completed each year multiplied by the size of the population of businesses affected. Together P and Q add up to a certain cost for businesses when complying with each information obligation contained in the law under examination.

In theory, the more details, the better. In practice, while complying with IO, companies carry out a number of activities that are sometimes difficult to distinguish. The cost of performing certain activities, P, especially when administrative processes are outsourced to external service providers (such as tax consultants, notaries, lawyers) is often available only in aggregate form, making it difficult to separate tariff and time. Germany suggests that in these cases the tariff of external providers shall be taken as a basis for calculation. However, the tariffs of these providers are generally

defined for a specific service (better, on a whole “package” of activities) and not on a time basis. Italy collects information regarding external costs in interviews with businesses and verify costs and their distribution among specific administrative activities in a focus group with professional advisors. External costs are summed up with internal costs and a total cost is calculated for each activity. This method, used in other countries, does not allow to have separate estimates of the average internal and external time needed to perform a specific activity.

In the first experimental phase Italy has also explored some method to separate average values for internal and external cost<sup>xvii</sup>.

In the case external costs are available in aggregate and it would not be possible to obtain the hourly rate of the service provider, the costs of administrative burdens  $P$  for the administrative activities is calculated as:

$$P = P_i + P_e = \frac{P_i * n_i + P_e * n_e}{n_t} = \frac{\left( \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{n_i} T_{ik} h_{ik}}{n_t} * n_i + \frac{\sum_{l=1}^{n_e} P_{el}}{n_{pe}} * n_e \right)}{n_t}$$

where  $n_t$  is the total number of firms that provide information useful for calculation,  $n_i$  is the number of firms that declared to use internal resources and  $n_e$  is the number of firms that declared to use external resources. Note that  $n_t$  may be lower than  $n_i+n_e$  if some firms in the sample use both internal and external resources.

Data gained through the interviews and judged not reliable and valid, should be omitted. The SCM manual does not clearly explain whether all data of the “inefficient” company have to be omitted from the analysis or only the specific values (for example, only time is to be omitted if the tariff is judged to be consistent with that declared by other firms in the group). This second hypothesis seems to be preferred in the need of economize the data collected. In this case, the total number of observation used to derive

the "typical" tariff may differ from the number of observations valid to calculate the typical time in hours and both of them may be lower than the total number of firms who provides information ( $n_t$ ).

The median is a much easier instrument than the mean to deal with mathematical issues as those indicated above, as well as being a more reliable tool for identifying the cost of a "typical" business.

#### **4.3. Coordinating units and monitoring groups.**

Eventually, the success of SCM methodology depends crucially on the presence and effectiveness of a central coordinating unit. This unit has the important role of setting the timetable and giving support and cooperation to consultants and departments for solving methodological issues. It is responsible of ensuring that the method is consistently applied by the consultants and in maintaining a good cooperation between the consultants and the departments.

Among the bodies charged with the responsibility of the SCM measurements are: the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency (division for Better Business Regulation) in Denmark, the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Norway, the Ministry of Finance in the Netherlands, the Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (Nutek) in Sweden.

In the United Kingdom, the Better Regulation Executive that coordinates the SCM measurements, previously part of the Cabinet Office, is now part of the new Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. This new Department inherits functions from the former Department of Trade and Industry, and bears responsibility for creating the conditions for business success through competitive and flexible markets and regulatory reform. It works across Government and with the regions to raise the levels of UK productivity.

In Italy the, the two main "drivers" of Better Regulation are both part of the Prime Minister's Office. These are the Minister for Normative Simplification, with the support of the Simplification Unit, and the Minister

for Public Administration and Innovation, with the support of the administrative simplification office. The former has the political responsibility and the overall competence for better regulation, and, in particular, for the implementation of the cutting-laws mechanism and for the regulatory reduction of burdens. The latter has the political responsibility for administrative simplification, measurement and administrative reduction of burdens, technological innovation, the reform and the modernization of public administration. The two bodies operates in a framework of strong cooperation.

To guarantee the success of SCM method and the accountability and comparability of the results, it would also be important to establish a monitoring group or unit, with the mission to follow, monitor and validate the results of the measurement. This group should involve, in addition to the central coordinating unit, representatives from the relevant departments and from business and businesses organisations.

## **5. The SCM: some problems and some advantages.**

Administrative burdens are usually defined as the information costs of regulation. The concept of IO is defined in opposition to substantive obligation stemming from regulation. Of course, focussing on information requirements set in the regulation can be justified on practical grounds for its relative simplicity. Getting data on the time needed for complying with paperwork obligation is certainly much simpler than calculating the whole compliance costs. Another reason is that paperwork is only indirectly linked to benefits and, as we will see later, this is linked to another basic assumption of the model: some burdens can be cut without affecting the benefit from regulation. Then, IO are in most cases instrumental to ensuring actual substantive compliance. But in some cases it may be reasonable to assume that compliance is virtually unaffected.

Notably this is the case in at least three instances:



- Some paperwork requirement may be redundant because the Public Administration already owns a certain piece of information. In this case a better integration (information sharing between different administrative bodies, unification and centralization of information collection) within the PA at different levels may preserve the same compliance with less paperwork and information burden for the business sector.
- Digitalization of administrative processes decreases paperwork and time waste without losses for compliance.
- A shift from controls across the board to a risk based approach may cut burdens were they are less likely to be productive in terms of increased compliance. Of course in this case the assumption of zero-effects on benefit is less tenable. But if the shift is accompanied by increased penalties for non compliance it may be reasonable.

Limiting attention to IOs is certainly a simplification of the task for the estimate of the burden. On the other side in some cases it may be difficult to define clearly whether a certain cost stems from an information obligation or not. A typical case is that of taxes or fees (transfers in general). In general this type of payments are excluded from the estimate of the SCM that is normally an estimate of the time needed to provide an obligation. Businesses can certainly hire (and often do it) an external professional to carry out the administrative activities necessary for an IO. But even in this case the estimate of the burden is based on the time (and a standard salary rate, with all the connected operational problems for the assessment) needed to carry out the activities that is often indeed been asked to the professional itself.

The exclusion of payments to the public administration however may be unsatisfactory some times. In some cases payments to the PA are justified explicitly by the need to finance efficient oversight. For example, in the Italian regulation of fire prevention, firms are required to pay a compulsory fee that finances an 'on site inspection' necessary to ensure that

regulation has been duly complied with. In some sense, the firm acquires the services of the PA to ensure that it complies with existing regulation. This payment is therefore a possible substitute for a payment to a private sector professional certifying the due compliance. In this case, paradoxically, a literal application of the SCM excluding the fee will no doubt underestimate the true cost of information exchanges between the business and the PA. A PA relying heavily on direct control will perform better in terms of administrative burdens than a PA relying on self certification. In our experience however this is hardly a good indicator of a less burdensome system.

Another potential problem with the definition of AB lies with the restriction of attention to the costs directly shouldered by businesses. While originally the definition of business was taken to include only strictly private and for-profit firms, according to most experts also non-profit and even some public organizations should be included in the measurement (in particular those providing services for tariff/charges). More importantly however concentrating on the direct costs to businesses may deliver an incomplete picture of the overall burdens of regulation. On one side the costs are not the sole type of burden incurred by businesses. During the implementation of the Italian measurement, businesses often complain about the delays of the PA in delivering permits for example. Thus, the simple cost dimension of the overall burden to the business system is an incomplete description as it overlooks the cost of delays and the uncertainty caused in the business operation.

Moreover there may be a trade-off between the cost to business and other categories of costs. Again Self-certification and Certification obtained by endorsed professionals are often used as substitutes for direct controls of the PA. The motivation is often that of "speeding the process". However both these modalities of regulation probably increase administrative burdens narrowly defined as direct costs, relative to a centralized system of controls that is necessarily more burdensome for the PA and are anyway more costly

in terms of delays for the business itself. In this respect the measurement may be misleading because incomplete.

Of course within the logic of the SCM, the benefits of the regulation under examination are not to be considered. Policy-makers should judge whether the benefits outweigh the costs of the regulation after the measurement has been carried.

Focusing on business is one of the pillars of the tool and sustaining and supporting private business through a lighter regulation can be assessed as a basic value for the policy maker. In the real world and when dealing with a large number of stakeholders, anyone with different strategic objective, the above can turn out as a weak point for the analyst who might miss or receive biased basic information for implementing an effective policy in line with the social welfare function of the society as a whole (see also Radaelli, 2007). Here comes the problem of deciding what is really "*disproportionate and irritant to business*": when implementing a measurement of controversial regulation where there are different stakeholders, assessing the threshold of proportionality and irritability can be difficult without precise information coming from the policy maker.

At the same time another key for implementing SCM is connected to the fact that any income that businesses may generate through the IO should be disregarded. This is something that might occur in the actual implementation and cannot be underestimated. Then, eventually, the definition of AB disqualifies lost turnover from being deemed an AB. According to the manuals, only costs that have actually been made in order to satisfy a statutory information obligation count as AB. In this respect, the picture provided by the measurement can be considered incomplete even for business, in terms of not considering the opportunity costs of the resources of the company involved in providing the compliance to regulation.

All the above are weak points of the SCM, directly linked to the pragmatic nature of the methodology. It is evident that only an appropriate Cost benefit Analysis (CBA) delivers a satisfactory evaluation of net benefits

maintaining a high level of transparency. The logic of CBA is that a community has limited resources and decision-makers must convey them towards the interventions capable of maximizing the net benefit for the community as a whole (and not only for a sub-set, the business). A transparent benefit-cost framework is best adapted to encompass a broad range of interests (social – economic- environmental impacts). However the hypothesis of implementing a fully fledged CBA on the whole of the existing regulation in a given country wouldn't be feasible (nor pass itself the CBA test probably), while a complete evaluation of AB, given the more limited scope and more pragmatic methodological approach of the analysis, has been already implemented in some countries. The current move of regulatory impact analysis toward more soft forms of CBA and toward an increase in partial analysis does not depend uniquely on dissatisfaction with formal CBA. As underlined by Jacobs (2006), the increase in partial analysis reflect the growing pressures on governance from the many groups of interests. Different sources of interest lead to different goals and kinds of analysis. SCM is mainly driven by competitiveness issues.

The main advantage and logic of the SCM however lies probably not in its formal properties but in its ability to deliver results. An important aspect of the properties of different tools of regulation is their practical ability to achieve their formal goal in the face of real world obstacles to their achievement and hence their efficacy rather than their theoretical efficiency. In this perspective the various instruments can and need to be evaluated not only for their formal properties but also for their chances of success in a given institutional and political system. In our opinion the main advantages of the SCM are to be found within this class of reasons. A tool for regulatory quality may be in theory the most efficient but it may be liable to biases or encounter problems in its application that undermine its desirability ex-ante.

There are at least two types of obstacles that are very relevant: the resistance of the administration (or more generally vested interest that promote stricter regulation) and the difficulty in maintaining simplification policies at a high level in the political agenda. On both grounds the SCM is

more likely to succeed than other tools. On the first account the SCM is a rather rigid tool. Given the quantitative nature of the evaluation and the limited need for ad hoc hypotheses it is more difficult to bend it to other purposes.

On the second account the strength of the SCM lies again in the commitment it requires to cut red tape. Once the 25% target is agreed and made public, it becomes a sensible target for politicians (and bureaucrats as well). Of course the fundamental tenets to achieve accountability of governments is their stability over a sufficient time horizon. Taking this requirement for granted however the 25% cut goal, mostly for its quantitative nature, requires a stronger commitment than any other target in the field of regulatory quality (Coco, 2006).

The Italian case provides an example of the capacity of the SCM to enhance political commitment to simplification policies. The Italian measurement of AB in the 5 areas identified by the PAS 2007 were completed - and the most burdensome procedures to be "cut", identified - in the first months of 2008, just before the election. The impending change of government had left the process *in limbo*, raising strong concerns about the possibility to complete the simplification. Contrary to pessimistic expectations, the new government has not only attached great importance to the results of the work, but has strengthened and accelerated the simplification process.

In few weeks the Government has given a strong acceleration to measures of normative simplification and administrative burdens' reduction, with Law decree No. 112/08, converted into l. 133/2008.

The law decree includes also concrete simplification measures for the labour area, consistent with the measurement results. According to first estimates, the cut would allow firms to save over 4 billions of euros, about 58% of the total administrative costs of the old procedures (quantified in 6,9 billions of euros).

## 6. Conclusions

The analysis of SCM in Europe and of the most significant experience of Member States demonstrates the potential of this methodology in promoting simplification policies and in supporting a new culture of policy making. The Italian experience confirms this potential but raises some methodological and substantial concerns on the validity of the SCM as a “stand-alone tool” to evaluate the impact of administrative requirements on enterprises and consequent interventions for burden reduction.

In particular, some points that we have raised and have to be duly considered follow:

- the SCM provides an advantage in terms of potential for commitment of the policy maker to simplification and regulatory quality policies.
- It is a flexible tool but it allows international comparison and benchmarking more than other alternatives. As such it is more likely to be useful in the EU where many countries implement the same regulation with different outcomes in terms of AB. Nonetheless benchmarking presupposes uniformity of the method applied, which as explained above is not always the case.
- Its pragmatic approach allows in theory full measurement of the AB from the whole regulatory system in a country (at a non negligible cost, though). This would be unthinkable with alternative tools.
- On the other hand it is an incomplete instrument. Benefits are ignored altogether and this may lead to big mistakes in the wrong hands.
- AB may be a misleading measure even of the real overall burden to a business. Letting aside other categories of compliance costs, for example costs stemming from delays are entirely ignored.
- The method suffers from the possibility of wide variation in the AB measured in connection with fundamental choices of regulatory policy (direct regulatory body control vs. self/self certification), and the structure of the State (centralized approach vs. federal state). In both cases the use of the results for comparison among countries may be misleading as measurement may be biased.

- According to manuals and implemented activities carried out so far, the number of businesses to be surveyed for the analysis are very limited in comparison to the universe of businesses (for instance, in Italy over 4.4 mn SMEs). In this respect, what is really a “representative sample” and how we are going to select a *normally efficient business*. In this respect there are still, too many hidden assumptions.
- When measuring administrative costs and assessing AB, the analysts should consider that different pieces of legislation on businesses are coming out from different level of government: in Italy, there is the EU level, the national level, the regional and municipal level for regulation on businesses. In this respect, for a homogeneous measurement, there is a need to come to a common model.

The discussion on each point above has been undertaken both at a general methodological level and, more importantly, considering the wide variety of solutions that each problem has received in different European countries. Taking into consideration all the above, our conclusion is that the SCM is a powerful tool for simplification. However it should be considered as an important component of a Global Programme, with a number of further tools needed to complement it, aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of existing policies and rules.

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<http://www.administrative-burdens.com/>

[http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs_en.htm)

<http://www.compliancecosts.com/>

[http://www.funzionepubblica.it/dipartimento/attivita/attivita\\_politiche\\_semp\\_lificazione.htm](http://www.funzionepubblica.it/dipartimento/attivita/attivita_politiche_semp_lificazione.htm)

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- i Notably the OECD's PMR and the World Bank's Doing business.
  - ii The SCM Network (<http://www.administrative-burdens.com/>) is an informal network of countries who use the standard cost model to measure and simplify their administrative burdens. All countries which use or are thinking of using the standard cost model can join the network, that currently involves: Australia-Victoria, Austria, Belgium, Flanders (Belgium), Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
  - iii Annex to the Communication on Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union Minimising administrative costs imposed by legislation, Detailed outline of a possible EU Net Administrative Cost Model {COM(2005)97 final}
  - iv "The Standard Cost Model - A framework for defining and quantifying administrative burdens for businesses (August 2004 ver.)"
  - v European Commission, Commission Working Document – Reducing AB in the EU 2007 progress report and 2008 outlook, COM(2008) January 2008, final.
  - vi COM (2002)278)
  - vii OJ C 321, 31.12.2003,
  - viii ("Implementing the Community Lisbon programme : A strategy for the simplification of the regulatory environment COM (2005) 0535
  - ix For a discussion of the institutional determinants of regulatory quality see Radaelli and De Francesco (2007).
  - x Commission working document COM(2006) 691: "Measuring administrative costs and reducing administrative burdens in the European Union"; Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM(2006) 689 : "A strategic review of Better Regulation in the European Union".
  - xi Accordingly, the Communication COM(2006) 691 states that, " ... the Action Programme focuses on mapping, measuring and removing IO imposed on businesses that have proven to be obsolete, redundant or repetitive: its aim is to improve the

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- effectiveness of legislation in 13 priority areas without jeopardizing its basic objectives  
...”.
- xii The Contractor is composed by 3 partners: Deloitte Touche (<http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/home/0,1044,sid%253D2774,00.html>), CapGemini (<http://www.capgemini.com/>) and Ramboll (<http://www.ramboll.com/eng/mainpage.htm>). The work of the Contractor has already started and the authors had the chance to meet personnel in charge for the measurement in Italy and verify the status of the project.
- xiii Council of the EU, Annex to Note a progress report on Better Regulation, November 2007, pag. 4.
- xiv in particular Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands and Norway. Also see specific countries’ manuals and in particular the Appendix to the UK SCM manual
- xv What manuals term a ‘normally efficient business’.
- xvi The overall estimate will not change substantially if larger firms were added. On the other side as they may bear substantially different costs they need to be surveyed separately increasing substantially the cost of the survey. On the whole the final aim of the SCM exercise is to cut firms’ administrative burdens. It makes therefore sense to concentrate on those firms for which AB make a difference.
- xvii More information are available from the authors upon request.