Words and Behavior
(1936)
Aldous Huxley

Words form the thread on which we string our experiences. Without them we should live spasmodically and intermittently. Hatred itself is not so strong that animals will not forget it, if distracted, even in the presence of the enemy. Watch a pair of cats, crouching on the brink of a fight. Balefully the eyes glare; from far down in the throat of each come bursts of a strange, strangled noise of defiance; as though animated by a life of their own, the tails twitch and tremble. With aimed intensity of loathing! Another moment and surely there must be an explosion. But no; all of a sudden one of the two creatures turns away, hoists a hind leg in a more than fascist salute and, with the same fixed and focused attention as it had given a moment before to its enemy, begins to make a lingual toilet. Animal love is as much at the mercy of distractions as animal hatred. The dumb creation lives a life made up of discreet and mutually irrelevant episodes. Such as it is, the consistency of human characters is due to the words upon which all human experiences are strung. We are purposeful because we can describe our feelings in rememberable words, can justify and rationalize our desires in terms of some kind of argument. Faced by an enemy we do not allow an itch to distract us from our emotions; the mere word “enemy” is enough to keep us reminded of our hatred, to convince us that we do well to be angry. Similarly the word “love” bridges for us those chasms of momentary indifference and boredom which gape from time to time between even the most ardent lovers. Feeling and desire provide us with our motive power; words give continuity to what we do and to a considerable extent determine our direction. Inappropriate and badly chosen words vitiate thought and lead to wrong or foolish conduct. Most ignorances are vincible, and in the greater number of cases stupidity is what the Buddha pronounced it to be, a sin. For, consciously, or subconsciously, it is with deliberation that we do not know or fail to understand—because incomprehension allows us, with a good conscience, to evade unpleasant obligations and responsibilities, because ignorance is the best excuse for going on doing what one likes, but ought not, to do. Our egotisms are incessantly fighting to preserve themselves, not only from external enemies, but also from the assaults of the other and better self with which they are so uncomfortably associated. Ignorance is egotism’s most effective defense against that Dr. Jekyll in us who desires perfection; stupidity, its subtlest stratagem. If, as so often happens, we choose to give continuity to our experience by means of words which falsify the facts, this is because the falsification is somehow to our advantage as egotists.

Consider, for example, the case of war. War is enormously discreditable to those who order it to be waged and even to those who merely tolerate its existence. Furthermore, to developed sensibilities the facts of war are revolting and horrifying. To falsify these facts, and by so doing to make war seem less evil than it really is, and our own responsibility in tolerating war less heavy, is doubly to our advantage. By suppressing and distorting the truth, we protect our sensibilities and preserve our self-esteem. Now, language is, among other things, a device which men use for suppressing and distorting the truth. Finding the reality of war too unpleasant to contemplate, we create a verbal alternative to that reality, parallel with it, but in quality quite different
from it. That which we contemplate thenceforward is not that to which we react emotionally and upon which we pass our moral judgments, is not war as it is in fact, but the fiction of war as it exists in our pleasantly falsifying verbiage. Our stupidity in using inappropriate language turns out, on analysis, to be the most refined cunning.

The most shocking fact about war is that its victims and its instruments are individual human beings, and that these individual human beings are condemned by the monstrous conventions of politics to murder or be murdered in quarrels not their own, to inflict upon the innocent and, innocent themselves of any crime against their enemies, to suffer cruelties of every kind.

The language of strategy and politics is designed, so far as it is possible, to conceal this fact, to make it appear as though wars were not fought by individuals drilled to murder one another in cold blood and without provocation, but either by impersonal and therefore wholly non-moral and impassible forces, or else by personified abstractions.

Here are a few examples of the first kind of falsification. In place of “cavalrymen” or “foot-soldiers” military writers like to speak of “sabres” and “rules.” Here is a sentence from a description of the Battle of Marengo: “According to Victor’s report, the French retreat was orderly; it is certain, at any rate, that the regiments held together, for the six thousand Austrian sabres found no opportunity to charge home.” The battle is between sabres in line and muskets in Echelon—a mere clash of ironmongery.

On other occasions there is no question of anything so vulgarly material as ironmongery. The battles are between Platonic ideas, between the abstractions of physics and mathematics. Forces interact; weights are flung into scales; masses are set in motion. Or else it is all a matter of geometry. Lines swing and sweep; are protracted or curved; pivot on a fixed point.

Alternatively the combatants are personal, in the sense that they are personifications. There is “the enemy,” in the singular, making “his” plans, striking “his” blows. The attribution of personal characteristics to collectivities, to geographical expressions, to institutions, is a source, as we shall see, of endless confusions in political thought, of innumerable political mistakes and crimes. Personification in politics is an error which we make because it is to our advantage as egotists to be able to feel violently proud of our country and of ourselves as belonging to it, and to believe that all the misfortunes due to our own mistakes are really the work of the Foreigner. It is easier to feel violently toward a person than toward an abstraction; hence our habit of making political personifications. In some cases military personifications are merely special instances of political personifications. A particular collectivity, the army or the warring nation, is given the name and, along with the name, the attributes of a single person, in order that we may be able to love or hate it more intensely than we could do if we thought of it as what it really is: a number of diverse individuals. In other cases personification is used for the purpose of concealing the fundamental absurdity and monstrosity of war. What is absurd and monstrous about war is that men who have no personal quarrel should be trained to murder one another in cold blood. By personifying opposing armies or countries, we are able to think of war as a conflict between individuals. The same result is obtained by writing of war as though it were carried on exclusively by the generals in command and not by the private soldiers in their armies. (“Rennenkampf had pressed back von Schubert.”) The implication in both cases is that war is indistinguishable from a bout of fisticuffs in a bar room. Whereas in reality it is profoundly different. A scrap between two individuals is forgivable; mass murder, deliberately organized, is a monstrous iniquity. We still choose to use war as an
instrument of policy; and to comprehend the full wickedness and absurdity of war
would therefore be inconvenient. For, once we understood, we should have to make
some effort to get rid of the abominable thing. Accordingly, when we talk about war, we
use a language which conceals or embellishes its reality. Ignoring the facts, so far as we
possibly can, we imply that battles are not fought by soldiers, but by things, principles,
allegories, personified collectivities, or (at the most human) by opposing commanders,
pitched against one another in single combat. For the same reason, when we have to
describe the processes and the results of war, we employ a rich variety of euphemisms.
Even the most violently patriotic and militaristic are reluctant to call a spade by its own
name. To conceal their intentions even from themselves, they make use of picturesque
metaphors. We find them, for example, clamoring for war planes numerous and
powerful enough to go and “destroy the hornets in their nests”—in other words, to go
and throw thermite, high explosives and vesicants upon the inhabitants of neighboring
countries before they have time to come and do the same to us. And how reassuring is
the language of historians and strategists! They write admiringly of those military
geniuses who know “when to strike at the enemy’s line” (a single combatant deranges
the geometrical constructions of a personification); when to “turn his flank”; when to
“execute an enveloping movement.” As though they were engineers discussing the
strength of materials and the distribution of stresses, they talk of abstract entities called
“man power” and “fire power.” They sum up the long-drawn sufferings and atrocities of
trench warfare in the phrase, “a war of attrition”; the massacre and mangling of human
beings is assimilated to the grinding of a lens.

A dangerously abstract word, which figures in all discussions about war, is “force.”
Those who believe in organizing collective security by means of military pacts against a
possible aggressor are particularly fond of this word. “You cannot,” they say, “have
international justice unless you are prepared to impose it by force.” “Peace-loving
countries must unite to use force against aggressive dictatorships.” “Democratic
institutions must be protected, if need be, by force.” And so on.

Now, the word “force,” when used in reference to human relations, has no single,
definite meaning. There is the “force” used by parents when, without resort to any kind
of physical violence, they compel their children to act or refrain from acting in some
particular way. There is the “force” used by attendants in an asylum when they try to
prevent a maniac from hurting himself or others. There is the “force” used by the police
when they control a crowd, and that other “force” which they used in a baton charge.
And finally there is the “force” used in war. This, of course, varies with the technological
devices at the disposal of the belligerents, with the policies they are pursuing, and with
the particular circumstances of the war in question. But in general it may be said that, in
war, “force” connotes violence and fraud used to the limit of the combatants’ capacity.

Variations in quantity, if sufficiently great, produce variations in quality. The
“force” that is war, particularly modern war, is very different from the “force” that is
police action, and the use of the same abstract word to describe the two dissimilar
processes is profoundly misleading. (Still more misleading, of course, is the explicit
assimilation of a war, waged by allied League-of-Nations powers against an aggressor, to
police action against a criminal. The first is the use of violence and fraud without limit
against innocent and guilty alike; the second is the use of strictly limited violence and a
minimum of fraud exclusively against the guilty.)

Reality is a succession of concrete and particular situations. When we think about
such situations we should use the particular and concrete words which apply to them. If
we use abstract words which apply equally well (and equally badly) to other, quite
dissimilar situations, it is certain that we shall think incorrectly.

Let us take the sentences quoted above and translate the abstract word “force” into
language that will render (however inadequately) the concrete and particular realities of
contemporary warfare.

“You cannot have international justice, unless you are prepared to impose it by
force.” Translated, this becomes: “You cannot have international justice unless you are
prepared, with a view to imposing a just settlement, to drop thermite, high explosives
and vesicants upon the inhabitants of foreign cities and to have thermite, high explosives
and vesicants dropped in return upon the inhabitants of your cities.” At the end of this
proceeding, justice is to be imposed by the victorious party—that is, if there is a
victorious party. It should be remarked that justice was to have been imposed by the
victorious party at the end of the last war. But, unfortunately, after four years of fighting,
the temper of the victors was such that they were quite incapable of making a just
settlement. The Allies are reaping in Nazi Germany what they sowed at Versailles. The
victors of the next war will have undergone intensive bombardments with thermite, high
explosives and vesicants. Will their temper be better than that of the Allies in 1918? Will
they be in a fitter state to make a just settlement? The answer, quite obviously, is: No. It is
psychologically all but impossible that justice should be secured by the methods of
contemporary warfare.

The next two sentences may be taken together. “Peace-loving countries must unite
to use force against aggressive dictatorships. Democratic institutions must be protected, if
need be, by force.” Let us translate. “Peace-loving countries must unite to throw thermite,
high explosives and vesicants on the inhabitants of countries ruled by aggressive
dictators. They must do this, and of course abide the consequences, in order to preserve
peace and democratic institutions.” Two questions immediately propound themselves.
First, is it likely that peace can be secured by a process calculated to reduce the orderly
life of our complicated societies to chaos? And, second, is it likely that democratic
institutions will flourish in a state of chaos? Again, the answers are pretty clearly in the
negative.

By using the abstract word “force,” instead of terms which at least attempt to
describe the realities of war as it is today, the preachers of collective security through
military collaboration disguise from themselves and from others, not only the
contemporary facts, but also the probable consequences of their favorite policy. The
attempt to secure justice, peace and democracy by “force” seems reasonable enough until
we realize, first, that this noncommittal word stands, in the circumstances of our age, for
activities which can hardly fail to result in social chaos; and second, that the
consequences of social chaos are injustice, chronic warfare and tyranny. The moment we
think in concrete and particular terms of the concrete and particular process called
“modern war,” we see that a policy which worked (or at least didn’t result in complete
disaster) in the past has no prospect whatever of working in the immediate future. The
attempt to secure justice, peace and democracy by means of a “force,” which means, at
this particular moment of history, thermite, high explosives and vesicants, is about as
reasonable as the attempt to put out a fire with a colorless liquid that happens to be, not
water, but petrol.

What applies to the “force” that is war applies in large measure to the “force” that is
revolution. It seems inherently very unlikely that social justice and social peace can be
secured by thermite, high explosives and vesicants. At first, it may be, the parties in a
civil war would hesitate to use such instruments on their fellow-countrymen. But there
can be little doubt that, if the conflict were prolonged (as it probably would be between
the evenly balanced Right and Left of a highly industrialized society), the combatants
would end by losing their scruples.

The alternatives confronting us seem to be plain enough. Either we invent and
conscientiously employ a new technique for making revolutions and settling
international disputes; or else we cling to the old technique and, using “force” (that is to
say, thermite, high explosives and vesicants), destroy ourselves. Those who, for whatever
motive, disguise the nature of the second alternative under inappropriate language,
render the world a grave disservice. They lead us into one of the temptations we find it
hardest to resist—the temptation to run away from reality, to pretend that facts are not
what they are. Like Shelley (but without Shelley’s acute awareness of what he was doing)
we are perpetually weaving

A shroud of talk to hide us from the sun
Of this familiar life.

We protect our minds by an elaborate system of abstractions, ambiguities,
metaphors and similes from the reality we do not wish to know too clearly; we lie to
ourselves, in order that we may still have the excuse of ignorance, the alibi of stupidity
and incomprehension, possessing which we can continue with a good conscience to
commit and tolerate the most monstrous crimes:

The poor wretch who has learned his only prayers
From curses, who knows scarcely words enough
To ask a blessing from his Heavenly Father,
Becomes a fluent phraseman, absolute
And technical in victories and defeats,
And all our dainty terms for fratricide;
Terms which we trundle smoothly o’er our tongues
Like mere abstractions, empty sounds to which
We join no meaning and attach no form!
As if the soldier died without a wound:
As if the fibers of this godlike frame
Were gored without a pang; as if the wretch
Who fell in battle, doing bloody deeds,
Passed off to Heaven translated and not killed;
As though he had no wife to pine for him,
No God to judge him.

The language we use about war is inappropriate, and its inappropriateness is
designed to conceal a reality so odious that we do not wish to know it. The language we
use about politics is also inappropriate; but here our mistake has a different purpose. Our principal aim in this case is to arouse and, having aroused, to rationalize and justify such intrinsically agreeable sentiments as pride and hatred, self-esteem and contempt for others. To achieve this end we speak about the facts of politics in words which more or less completely misrepresent them.

The concrete realities of politics are individual human beings, living together in national groups. Politicians—and to some extent we are all politicians—substitute abstractions for these concrete realities, and having done this, proceed to invest each abstraction with an appearance of concreteness by personifying it. For example, the concrete reality of which “Britain” is the abstraction consists of some forty-odd millions of diverse individuals living on an island off the west coast of Europe. The personification of this abstraction appears, in classical fancy-dress and holding a very large toasting fork, on the backside of our copper coinage; appears in verbal form, every time we talk about international politics. “Britain,” the abstraction from forty millions of Britons, is endowed with thoughts, sensibilities and emotions, even with a sex—for, in spite of John Bull, the country is always a female.

Now, it is of course possible that “Britain” is more than a mere name—is an entity that possesses some kind of reality distinct from that of the individuals constituting the group to which the name is applied. But this entity, if it exists, is certainly not a young lady with a toasting fork; nor is it possible to believe (though some eminent philosophers have preached the doctrine) that it should possess anything in the nature of a personal will. One must agree with T. H. Green that “there can be nothing in a nation, however exalted its mission, or in a society however perfectly organized, which is not in the persons composing the nation or the society... We cannot suppose a national spirit and will to exist except as the spirit and will of individuals.” But the moment we start resolutely thinking about our world in terms of individual persons we find ourselves at the same time thinking in terms of universality. “The great rational religions,” writes Professor Whitehead, “are the outcome of the emergence of a religious consciousness that is universal, as distinguished from tribal, or even social. Because it is universal, it introduces the note of solitariness.” (And he might have added that, because it is solitary, it introduces the note of universality.) “The reason of this connection between universality and solitude is that universality is a disconnection from immediate surroundings.” And conversely the disconnection from immediate surroundings, particularly such social surrounding as the tribe or nation, the insistence on the person as the fundamental reality, leads to the conception of an all-embracing unity.

A nation, then, may be more than a mere abstraction, may possess some kind of real existence apart from its constituent members. But there is no reason to suppose that it is a person; indeed, there is every reason to suppose that it isn’t. Those who speak as though it were a person (and some go further than this and speak as though it were a personal god) do so, because it is to their interest as egotists to make precisely this mistake.

In the case of the ruling class these interests are in part material. The personification of the nation as a sacred being, different from and superior to its constituent members, is merely (I quote the words of a great French jurist, Leon Duguit) “a way of imposing authority by making people believe it is an authority de jure and not merely de facto.” By habitually talking of the nation as though it were a person with thoughts, feelings and a will of its own, the rulers of a country legitimate their own powers. Personification leads easily to deification; and where the nation is deified, its government ceases to be a mere convenience, like drains or a telephone system, and, partaking in the sacredness of the
entity it represents, claims to give orders by divine right and demands the unquestioning obedience due to a god. Rulers seldom find it hard to recognize their friends. Hegel, the man who elaborated an inappropriate figure of speech into a complete philosophy of politics, was a favorite of the Prussian government. “Es ist,” he had written, “es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt, das der Staat ist.” The decoration bestowed on him by Frederick William III was richly deserved.

Unlike their rulers, the ruled have no material interest in using inappropriate language about states and nations. For them, the reward of being mistaken is psychological. The personified and deified nation becomes, in the minds of the individuals composing it, a kind of enlargement of themselves. The superhuman qualities which belong to the young lady with the toasting fork, the young lady with plaits and a brass soutien-gorge, the young lady in a Phrygian bonnet, are claimed by individual Englishmen, Germans and Frenchmen as being, at least in part, their own. Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori. But there would be no need to die, no need of war, if it had not been even sweeter to boast and swagger for one’s country, to hate, despise, swindle and bully for it. Loyalty to the personified nation, or to the personified class or party, justifies the loyal in indulging all those passions which good manners and the moral code do not allow them to display in their relations with their neighbors. The personified entity is a being, not only great and noble, but also insanely proud, vain and touchy; fiercely rapacious; a braggart; bound by no considerations of right and wrong. (Hegel condemned as hopelessly shallow all those who dared to apply ethical standards to the activities of nations. To condone and applaud every iniquity committed in the name of the State was to him a sign of philosophical profundity.) Identifying themselves with this god, individuals find relief from the constraints of ordinary social decency, feel themselves justified in giving rein, within duly prescribed limits, to their criminal proclivities. As a loyal nationalist or party-man, one can enjoy the luxury of behaving badly with a good conscience.

The evil passions are further justified by another linguistic error—the error of speaking about certain categories of persons as though they were mere embodied abstractions. Foreigners and those who disagree with us are not thought of as men and women like ourselves and our fellow-countrymen; they are thought of as representatives and, so to say, symbols of a class. In so far as they have any personality at all, it is the personality we mistakenly attribute to their class—a personality that is, by definition, intrinsically evil. We know that the harming or killing of men and women is wrong, and we are reluctant consciously to do what we know to be wrong. But when particular men and women are thought of merely as representatives of a class, which has previously been defined as evil and personified in the shape of a devil, then the reluctance to hurt or murder disappears. Brown, Jones and Robinson are no longer thought of as Brown, Jones and Robinson, but as heretics, gentiles, Yids, niggers, barbarians, Huns, communists, capitalists, fascists, liberals—whichever the case may be. When they have been called such names and assimilated to the accursed class to which the names apply, Brown, Jones and Robinson cease to be conceived as what they really are—human persons—and become for the users of this fatally inappropriate language mere vermin or, worse, demons whom it is right and proper to destroy as thoroughly and as painfully as possible. Wherever persons are present, questions of morality arise. Rulers of nations and leaders of parties find morality embarrassing. That is why they take such pains to depersonalize their opponents. All propaganda directed against an opposing group has but one aim: to substitute diabolical abstractions for concrete persons. The propagandist’s
purpose is to make one set of people forget that certain other sets of people are human. By robbing them of their personality, he puts them outside the pale of moral obligation. Mere symbols can have no rights—particularly when that of which they are symbolical is, by definition, evil.

Politics can become moral only on one condition: that its problems shall be spoken of and thought about exclusively in terms of concrete reality; that is to say, of persons. To depersonify human beings and to personify abstractions are complementary errors which lead, by an inexorable logic, to war between nations and to idolatrous worship of the State, with consequent governmental oppression. All current political thought is a mixture, in varying proportions, between thought in terms of concrete realities and thought in terms of depersonified symbols and personified abstractions. In the democratic countries the problems of internal politics are thought about mainly in terms of concrete reality; those of external politics, mainly in terms of abstractions and symbols. In dictatorial countries the proportion of concrete to abstract and symbolic thought is lower than in democratic countries. Dictators talk little of persons, much of personified abstractions, such as the Nation, the State, the Party, and much of depersonified symbols, such as Yids, Bolsheviks, Capitalists. The stupidity of politicians who talk about a world of persons as though it were not a world of persons is due in the main to self-interest. In a fictitious world of symbols and personified abstractions, rulers find that they can rule more effectively, and the ruled, that they can gratify instincts which the conventions of good manners and the imperatives of morality demand that they should repress. To think correctly is the condition of behaving well. It is also in itself a moral act; those who would think correctly must resist considerable temptations.

(From The Olive Tree)